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Abstract
Many debt claims, such as bonds, are resaleable, whereas others, such as repos, are
not. There was a ﬁvefold increase in repo borrowing before the 2008 crisis. Why?
Did banks’ dependence on non-resaleable debt precipitate the crisis? In this paper, we
develop a model of bank lending with credit frictions. The key feature of the model is
that debt claims are heterogenous in their resaleability. We ﬁnd that decreasing credit
market frictions leads to an increase in borrowing via non-resaleable debt. Borrowing
via non-resaleable debt has a dark side: it causes credit chains to form, since if a bank
makes a loan via non-resaleable debt and needs liquidity, it cannot sell the loan but
must borrow via a new contract. These credit chains are a source of systemic risk, since
one bank’s default harms not only its creditors but also its creditors’ creditors. Overall,
our model suggests that reducing credit market frictions may have an adverse eﬀect on
the ﬁnancial system and may even lead to the failures of ﬁnancial institutions.
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Credit frictions decreased substantially in the decades leading up to the 2008 ﬁnancial
crisis.1 This coincided with the expansion of repo markets, which grew ﬁvefold between
1990 and 2007. Before the crisis, the value of outstanding repos in the US exceeded
ﬁve trillion USD.2 The markets appeared to be functioning well, allowing banks to ﬁnd
cheap, short-term liquidity. However, they were harboring systemic risk, because banks
were exposed to one another in credit chains. This meant that if one bank defaulted,
it harmed not only its immediate creditors, but potentially its creditors’ creditors as
well. This systemic risk manifested itself in the ﬁnancial crisis, in which shocks to a
relatively small set of assets threatened to bring down the entire ﬁnancial system. Did
the buildup of systemic risk relate to the decrease in credit frictions? In general, can a
decrease in credit frictions cause an increase in systemic risk?
In this paper, we construct a corporate ﬁnance-style model to address this question.
We ﬁnd that the answer is yes. Our main result is that a decrease in credit frictions
increases systemic risk. This is because the decrease in credit frictions leads credit
chains to become more widespread, and these credit chains harbor systemic risk.
The key novel ingredient in our model is the heterogeneous resaleability of debt
claims. For concreteness, consider the salient examples of bonds and repos. Bonds are
resaleable, whereas repos are not.3 As a result, lending via repos leads to credit chains,
whereas lending via bonds does not. To see this, suppose you are a lender—you have
a loan on the asset side of your balance sheet—and you suddenly need liquidity. Your
options for raising this liquidity are diﬀerent if you hold a bond than if you hold a repo.
If you hold a bond you can sell it in the market. In contrast, if you hold a repo, you
cannot sell it. Hence, you obtain liquidity by borrowing via a new repo. This creates a
credit chain, because you are now not only a creditor in the original repo, but a debtor
in the new repo as well. In summary, when you hold a non-resalebale instrument such
as a repo, the result is a credit chain. This brings with it systemic risk, since defaults
can transmit through the chain.
1Low credit market frictions in the US before the crisis reﬂected a number of factors, including advanced
information technology for execution and settlement, low transaction costs (Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan
(2001), Jones (2002)), relatively low information asymmetries (Bai, Philippon, and Savov (2012),
Greenwood, Sanchez, and Wang (2013)), and a number of potential legal factors, such as privileged
bankruptcy treatment of some bank liabilities (Morrison, Roe, and Sontchi (2014)) and required ﬁnancial
disclosure (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006)).
2See Homquist and Gallin (2014).
3That bonds are resaleable and repos are not is a formal legal property of these claims. Other ﬁnancial
claims, such as derivatives, are also not resaleable; we comment on our model’s applicability to derivative
markets in Subsection 1.1.
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How does a change in credit frictions aﬀect your choice whether to lend with a bond
or a repo? In our model, a decrease in credit frictions makes you relatively more likely
to lend via a repo. This is due to the fact that when you are an intermediate link in a
credit chain, there are two contracts that must be enforced, one between you and your
creditor and another between you and your debtor. Thus, you bear the costs of credit
frictions twice, once for each contract. If frictions are high, you have a strong incentive
to avoid these double costs. To do this you lend via resaleable debt like bonds. In this
case, no credit chain is formed and systemic risk is low. On the other hand, if credit
frictions are low, you have a weaker incentive to avoid the costs of credit chains. You
may prefer to lend via non-resaleable debt like repos, as repos may come with other
advantages, such as preferential treatment in bankruptcy or lower issuance costs. In
this case, credit chains form and systemic risk is high. This is the essence of our main
result: decreasing credit market frictions can increase systemic risk. The reason is that
decreasing credit frictions makes it is less likely that banks issue resalable debt and,
hence, more likely that credit chains form.
Model preview. We now describe our model and results in more detail. We model
the interbank market within a classical corporate ﬁnance framework. At the core of
the model is one ﬁnancial institution, which we call Bank A, that needs to raise ﬁnance
in order to scale up a project. Bank A borrows from a competitive creditor, which we
call Bank B. Bank A can borrow via one of two instruments, a bond or a repo.4 As
discussed above, a bond is resaleable whereas a repo is not. The amount that a bank
can borrow is limited by the assets it can pledge, via a standard limit to pledgeabity.
Speciﬁcally, the repayment a bank makes to its creditor cannot exceed a ﬁxed fraction
θ of the bank’s assets. This fraction θ, which we refer to as the “enforceability” in the
economy, captures credit frictions. An increase in enforceability θ corresponds to a
decrease in credit frictions. At an interim date, after Bank B has made the loan to
Bank A, it may suﬀer a “liquidity shock,” i.e. it may suddenly need cash. If Bank B
suﬀers a liquidity shock, it raises liquidity in the interbank market from a third ﬁnancial
institution, which we call Bank C. Speciﬁcally, Bank B raises this liquidity either by
selling Bank A’s bond to Bank C or by entering a new repo agreement with Bank C.
Considering resaleability alone, bonds are strictly preferable to repos. However,
repos may be preferable to bonds along dimensions other than resaleability. In our
baseline model, we focus on the fact that repos are senior to bonds in bankruptcy;
4We use the labels repo and bond throughout for non-resaleable and resaleable instruments, respectively.
Note that when we think about short-term bank funding, the kind of bond we have in mind is commercial
paper. We discuss the applicability of our model to short-term bank funding further in Subsection 1.1 and
to more general abstract settings in Subsection 4.1.
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Bank B’s Sale of Bank A’s Bonds to Bank C
Bank A
A’s debt to B A’s debt to C
θC buys A’s bonds
Bank B Bank C
Figure 1: Because bonds are resaleable, Bank B obtains liquidity by selling Bank A’s bonds
to Bank C. No credit chain emerges.
in fact, they are exempt from bankruptcy stays in reality. Thus, Bank A trades oﬀ
the resaleability beneﬁt of bonds against the seniority beneﬁt of repos. However, we
would like to emphasize that our model captures a general ﬁnancing trade-oﬀ between
resaleabale and non-resaleable debt; the case of bonds vs. repos is only one example
of this trade-oﬀ, albeit an economically important one. We focus on these interbank
markets for concreteness and simplicity. In Subsection 4.1, we apply our model to
general debt markets with frictions following Kiyotaki and Moore (2005) and show that
our results hold in that setting. In particular, the speciﬁc assumption that repos are
senior in bankruptcy is not necessary.
Results preview. First consider the case in which Bank A borrows from Bank B
via a bond. In this case, when Bank B suﬀers a liquidity shock, it sells Bank A’s bond
to Bank C. This sale is depicted in Figure 1. Observe that Bank A now has a debt to
Bank C directly. There is no credit chain. There is only one contract to be enforced,
the debt from Bank A to Bank C. Credit frictions kick in only once and Bank A’s debt
capacity is (roughly) proportional to the enforceability θ of this contract.
Now turn to the case in which Bank A borrows from Bank B via a repo. In this
case, when Bank B suﬀers a liquidity shock, it must enter into a new contract to ﬁnd
liquidity—because Bank A’s repo debt is not resaleable, Bank B cannot liquidate it
3
A Credit Chain from Bank A to Bank B to Bank C
Bank A
A’s debt to B
θ
Bank B B’s debt to C
θ
Bank C
Figure 2: A credit chain emerges when Bank A borrows from Bank B via repos.
in the market. Thus, Bank A borrows from Bank C via a new repo contract. This is
depicted in Figure 2. Observe that Bank A has debt to Bank B and Bank B has debt
to Bank C. There is a credit chain. There are two contracts to be enforced. Credit
frictions kick in twice, once at each link in the credit chain, and Bank A’s debt capacity
is (roughly) proportional to the enforceability squared or θ× θ. Intuitively, there is one
θ for each of the two contracts.
Now consider how an increase in enforceability aﬀects Bank A’s choice between
bonds and repos. As θ increases, the amount Bank A can borrow with bonds increases
linearly and the amount Bank A can borrow with repos increases quadratically. In
other words, the sensitivity of Bank A’s debt capacity to enforceability is higher when
it borrows via repos than when it borrowers via bonds. Thus, as credit frictions decrease,
Bank A switches from bond borrowing to repo borrowing.
What are the implications of increasing enforceability for systemic risk? We have
just established that increasing enforceability leads Bank A to borrow via repos and
that this, in turn, leads to credit chains. Credit chains harbor systemic risk because if
Bank A defaults on its debt to Bank B, Bank B may default on its debt to Bank C.
In our model, such default cascades can arise only when enforceability is high, because
that is when Bank A funds itself with repos and credit chains emerge. Note that even
though increasing enforceability improves the functioning of each market individually,
it may have an adverse eﬀect on the system as a whole, causing an increase in systemic
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risk.
Policy. Our model is stylized, but may still cast light on policy debate. Should
repos maintain their special treatment in bankruptcy? The exemption from automatic
stays for repos makes repos more desirable to Bank A. Thus, the exemption leads Bank
A to undertake more repo borrowing and, hence, leads to more credit chains. Since
these credit chains are the source of systemic risk in the model, the exemption from the
stay exacerbates systemic risk.
Our ﬁndings also aﬃrm that regulators must take a macro-prudential approach, as
decreasing credit frictions makes every market function better individually, but makes
the system as a whole more dangerous.
Layout. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. There are two remain-
ing subsections in the Introduction, ﬁrst, a discussion of the realism of our assumptions
and the empirical relevance of our results and, second, a review of related literature.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 contains the formal analysis. In Section 4, we
do three extensions to aﬃrm the importance and robustness of our conclusions. First,
we adapt the model to a more general economic setting and argue that our main result
that increasing enforceability can increase systemic risk applies to a broad variety of
settings, not only to the interbank market we focus on in the baseline model. Second,
we include default costs to show that under reasonable assumptions increasing systemic
risk is tantamount to decreasing social welfare. Third, we take the role of repo collat-
eral more seriously than we do in the baseline model and we argue that our results are
not driven by simplifying assumptions about how contracts are collateralized. Section
5 concludes. Appendix A contains omitted derivations and proofs.
1.1 Realism and Empirical Evidence
While our model is stylized, we believe that our baseline model provides a useful approx-
imation of the interbank market, with reasonable assumptions and predictions. Here we
discuss these brieﬂy in connection with empirical work. First, we point out that repos
and asset-backed commercial paper (a type of bond) are relatively substitutable instru-
ments for short-term bank funding. This is because they both have relatively short ma-
turities and they are often secured by similar collateral (Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov
(2014)). Second, we suggest that the bankruptcy advantage of repos is important, as
repo volume increased after Congress introduced the safe harbor provision (Garbade
(2006)). Third, we emphasize that credit chains are an important feature of the repo
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market (repo chains are typically associated with the so-called “rehypothecation”5 of
collateral, see Singh and Aitken (2010) and Singh (2010)). Banks assume oﬀsetting
long and short repo positions, even though many repos are very short-term and it may
seem that they should be “self-liquidating.” This may be because banks manage liquid-
ity over very short time horizons, taking oﬀsetting positions within each day. Another
reason for this may be that many repos are of longer maturities, with an estimated
thirty percent of repos having maturity longer than a month (Comotto (2015)). Fi-
nally, many repos have “open” tenors, with no speciﬁed maturity. These are typically
thought about as overnight contracts, but a lender in an open repo must give its coun-
terparty notice before closing the contract; sometimes several weeks’ notice is required
(Comotto (2014)).
We would also like to point out that our model also applies to ﬁnancial derivatives.
Like repos, derivatives are non-resaleable instruments that enjoy special treatment in
bankruptcy. Further, derivatives markets grew even more dramatically than repo mar-
kets in the years before the 2008 crisis. The notional value of all ﬁnancial derivatives
contracts was estimated at 766 trillion USD in 2009, a three hundred-fold increase from
thirty years earlier (Stulz (2009)). Repos and derivatives often constitute a larger frac-
tion of banks’ balance sheets than bonds of all maturities combined. For example, in
2009 over forty-ﬁve percent of Barclay’s liabilities were listed as “repurchase agreements
and stock lending” or “derivatives” on its balance sheet.6
Our application to the interbank market depends on the assumption that there
are frictions in the interbank market. In particular, we assume that there is limited
enforceability of contracts or, equivalently, limited pledgeability of cash ﬂows. The
assumption is standard in the theory literature—for example, Homstrom and Tirole
(2011) make the assumption and provide a list of “several reasons why this [limited
enforceability] is by and large reality” (p. 3). We think that the realism of the assump-
tion for our application is demonstrated by the importance of collateral in interbank
contracts (Bank for International Settlements (2013))—if there were no pledgeablity
frictions, banks would not need to post collateral at all. In addition, the years-long
bankruptcy proceedings of Lehman Brothers demonstrated that bank creditors can
face severe frictions when trying to claim repayment. Further, we point out that our
5Since a repo contract is formally the sale and repurchase of assets, not the pledging (or “hypothecating”)
of collateral, the term “rehypothecation” is not favored by lawyers.
6Barclay’s annual reports are available online here <https://www.home.barclays/barclays-investor-relations/
results-and-reports/annual-reports.html>. The Royal Bank of Scotland reports similar numbers (see
<http://investors.rbs.com/annual-report-subsidiary-results/2010.aspx>). The corresponding ﬁgures are
hard to ﬁnd for US banks, since they classify their derivatives holdings as risk management instruments
and, therefore, are not required to list them on their balance sheets.
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model does not rely on the assumption that contractual enforceability is weak, but
only on the assumption that it is imperfect, which we believe it is for all contracts in
practice.
Finally, to emphasize the empirical importance of the problem we study, we remark
that several papers suggest that the systemic risk that built up in the repo market may
have played an important role in the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008–2009 (Copeland, Martin,
and Walker 2014, Gorton and Metrick (2010), Gorton and Metrick (2012), Krishna-
murthy, Nagel, and Orlov (2014)).7
1.2 Related Literature
Our paper is not the ﬁrst to emphasize the potential economic importance of resaleabil-
ity in the context of an economic model of limited enforcement; Kiyotaki and Moore
(2000) also analyze how the resaleability of debt claims can mitigate the allocational
ineﬃciencies that stem from limits to enforceability.8 They demonstrate that a small
amount of resaleability (or “multilateral commitment”) can substitute for a substantial
lack of enforceability (or “bilateral commitment”) in a deterministic, inﬁnite horizon
economy. Rather than focus on allocational eﬃciency as they do, we study borrow-
ers’ endogenous choice of instruments and analyze the implications for systemic risk.
Our analysis points to a potential dark side of enforceability that is not present in
Kiyotaki and Moore’s deterministic setting.
In another 2001 paper, Kiyotaki and Moore study credit chains. Rather than study
the transferability of debt, that paper shows how chains of bilateral borrowing can
emerge and, as such, it constitutes an early contribution to the growing literature
on ﬁnancial networks. Many papers in this literature study systemic risk, including
Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Thabaz-Salehi (2013), Allen, Babus, and Carletti (2012),
Allen and Gale (2000), Blumh, Faia, and Krahnen (2013), Cabrales, Gottardi, and
Vega-Redondo (2013), Elliott, Golub, and Jackson (2014), Gale and Kariv (2007),
Glode and Opp (2013), Rahi and Zigrand (2013), and Zawadowski (2013). In only
a few of these papers, however, is the equilibrium network endogenous. An emerging
theory literature takes a detailed approach to modeling credit chains in the repo market
speciﬁcally, including Kahn and Park (2015), Infante (2015), and Lee (2015).
Numerous other papers study the circulation of private debt, including Gorton
and Pennacchi (1990), Gu, Mattesini, Monnet, and Wright (2013), Kahn and Roberts
(2007), and Townsend and Wallace (1987). These papers typically do not consider
7Note that these papers dispute the way in which repos contributed to the crisis.
8In this paper, Kiyotaki and Moore develop a framework that they explore further in subsequent work,
including Kiyotaki and Moore (2001a), Kiyotaki and Moore (2005), and Kiyotaki and Moore (2012).
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debt resaleability as a choice of the borrower and, therefore, they do not study the
implications of this choice for systemic risk.
We also hope to contribute to the debate surrounding the bankruptcy seniority of
repos and derivatives. Relevant papers in this literature include Antinolﬁ, Carapella,
Kahn, Martin, Mills, and Nosal (2014), Bliss and Kaufman (2006), Duﬃe and Skeel
(2006), Edwards and Morrison (2005), Lubben (2009), Roe (2011), and Skeel and Jack-
son (2012). Notably, Bolton and Oehmke (2014) bring a corporate ﬁnance model to
bear on the question of bankruptcy seniority, but they focus on the exemptions for
derivatives.
2 Model
In this section we set up the model, outlining the players and their technologies, the
debt instruments by which they can borrow, the speciﬁc nature of limited enforcement,
and the timing of moves. We also include a subsection describing several restrictions
that we impose on parameters.
2.1 Players and Technologies
There is one good called cash. There are three dates Date 0, Date 1, and Date 2.
The time between Date t and Date t + 1 is called “overnight.” Cash is the input of
production, the output of production, and the consumption good. The main actor in
the model is a risk-neutral bank called Bank A. Bank A has an endowment of e pounds
and a risky constant-returns-to-scale technology. The technology takes two periods to
produce, starting at Date 0 and terminating at Date 2. It has random gross return R˜,
which is RH with probability π and RL < RH with probability 1− π. Figure 3 depicts
the technology. We call the event that R˜ = RH “success” and the event that R˜ = RL
“failure.” Denote the expected return by R¯ := πRH + (1 − π)RL.9
Bank A funds its investment by borrowing capital I from a competitive market
of risk-neutral banks. The project is scaleable, so the quantity I is determined in
equilibrium. We model the competitive market in reduced form by having Bank A
make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to borrow from a second risk-neutral bank, Bank B. Bank
B breaks even in expectation but its preferences are uncertain: with probability 1− μ
Bank B values consumption only at Date 1 and with probability μ it values consumption
9Note that we think about π as rather large so that failure is an extreme event. In the repo market,
failure should be interpreted as the joint event in which Bank A’s project fails and the value of its pledged
collateral is not suﬃcient to cover its loan. We do not model this collateral explicitly here, but we discuss it







Figure 3: Depiction of Bank A’s technology.
only at Date 2 (all random variables are pairwise independent). To be more speciﬁc,
with probability 1− μ Bank B lexicographically prefers Date 1 consumption to Date 2
consumption; with probability μ Bank B lexicographically prefers Date 2 consumption
to Date 1 consumption.10 We call the event that a bank wishes to consume at Date
1 a “liquidity shock.” The inclusion of the possibility that a bank is hit by a liquidity
shock is a simple way to generate a motive for trade in a secondary market at Date
1—when hit by a liquidity shock, Bank B wishes either to resell Bank A’s debt or to
borrow against Bank A’s debt to satisfy its liquidity needs at Date 1.
For simplicity, we assume that Bank B has deep pockets at Date 0. By “deep
pockets” we mean that it has suﬃcient cash to fund Bank A at Date 0 so that Bank A
does not need to ﬁnd a second creditor. If Bank B is hit by a liquidity shock, it uses all
this cash to generate liquidity at Date 1. We discuss the role of assets in place further
in Appendix 4.3.
There is a competitive interbank market open at Date 1, in which banks buy and
sell bonds in the secondary market as well as borrow and lend among themselves. We
model this by allowing Bank B to obtain funds from a third risk-neutral bank, Bank
C. Bank B can either sell Bank A’s debt or borrow against it. Again, competition is
captured by assuming that Bank B makes Bank C a take-it-or-leave it oﬀer, whether
10The lexicographic preferences are just a modelling device that induces Bank B to have well-deﬁned
preference for more to less at Date 2 even if it is hit by a liquidity shock at Date 1; this is important only
in the details of micro-founding enforcement constraints (see Subsection 2.3 below).
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Date 0
Bank A returns R˜
Date 1 Date 2
Bank A borrows from Bank B Bank B suﬀers liquidity shock Repayment
Bank B obtains liquidity from Bank C
Figure 4: Timeline when Bank B suﬀers a liquidity shock.
to sell bonds or to borrow against repos.
Figure 4 depicts the timing described here for the case in which Bank B suﬀers a
liquidity shock. Subsection 2.4 below gives a more formal description of the timing.
2.2 Borrowing Instruments
The crux of the model is the trade-oﬀ between borrowing via a bilateral contract called
a repo and borrowing via a resaleable instrument called a bond. In the model, two
features distinguish repos from bonds. The ﬁrst feature is that bonds are resaleable. A
bank that buys a bond can sell it to another bank in the Date-1 market. The issuer of
the bond repays its bearer at maturity, regardless of whether this bearer was the original
owner at Date 0. Repos, in contrast, are not resaleable. A repo must be settled by the
writer and its counterparty. The second feature that distinguishes repos from bonds is
that repos are not stayed in bankruptcy.11 The counterparty to a repo recoups its debt
immediately, even if its counterparty defaults. The counterparty to a bond, in contrast,
must wait to liquidate until it is awarded the assets in the bankruptcy proceedings. To
capture the costs of waiting to liquidate, we normalize bondholders’ liquidation value
to zero in the event of default.12 We assume that the realization of R˜ is not veriﬁable,
so state-contingent contracts are impossible. Thus, as in reality, both bonds and repos
11As mentioned in the Introduction, this speciﬁc assumption of seniority is not essential for our main
results, as we discuss in Subsection 4.1.
12We make this assumption following Bolton and Oehmke (2014), because it provides an easy way to
model bankruptcy costs. In our model, it will also imply that the value of the bond in the event of default
is independent of enforcement frictions. In Subsection 4.1, we relax this assumption to ensure that it is not
driving our results.
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Two Dimensions of Legal Asymmetry:
Transferability and Bankruptcy Treatment
super-senior less senior
resaleable e.g. bonds, stock
not resaleable e.g. repos, derivatives
Figure 5: A table that depicts the two dimensions of legal asymmetry we focus on, trans-
ferability and bankruptcy treatment. Bonds and stock are resaleable, but they are junior in
bankruptcy to non-resaleable instruments such as repos and derivatives.
are debt contracts, i.e. promises to repay a state-independent face value in the future in
exchange for cash today. We summarize the dimensions along which repos and bonds
diﬀer in Figure 5.
A main question we ask is under what conditions Bank A will fund its Date 0
investment via repos as opposed to bonds. When Bank A determines its funding in-
strument, it will face a trade-oﬀ in borrowing costs. Repos decrease borrowing costs
because creditors have higher recovery values in the event of default; in contrast, bonds
reduce borrowing costs because they may come with a liquidity premium. This liquid-
ity premium is a result of the fact that lenders can sell them at Date 1 to meet their
liquidity needs when they suﬀer liquidity shocks. That is to say, borrowers trade oﬀ
bonds’ resaleability against repos’ super-seniority.
2.3 Limited Enforcement
The key friction in the economy is limited enforcement. We assume that creditors
cannot extract all of a project’s surplus when they collect on their debts. In particular,
there is an exogenous number θ ∈ (0, 1) that gives an upper bound on the proportion
of assets that a creditor can extract from its debtor, heuristically
repayment ≤ θ × assets . (1)
Note that this proportion θ is the same for all debts in the economy. We refer to
θ as the enforceability in the economy. θ represents creditors’ power to extract repay-
ment from debtors; developments that we would expect to increase θ include eﬃcient
liquidation procedures, strong creditor rights, standardized contracts, technological de-
11
velopment for improved recored keeping, and increased accounting transparency.
The formal micro-foundation we provide for the constraint above (inequality (1))
comes from borrowers’ incentives to divert assets and abscond. Speciﬁcally, θ is the
pledgeable proportion of assets. We assume that this fraction θ is not divertable. In
other words, a borrower with assets A has the option to divert (1 − θ)A and then
default. Thus a borrower will repay debt with face value F only if the residual value
net of repayment exceeds its gain from diverting, or
A− F ≥ (1− θ)A.
This inequality can be rewritten as
F ≤ θA,
which is simply inequality (1) restated symbolically. With this formalism, an increase in
enforceability is an increase in the collateralizability or securitizability of assets, which
makes it harder for borrowers to divert.
Note Subsection 2.4 formalizes this diversion motive which leads endogenously to
the constraint in inequality (1).
2.4 Timing
We now specify the timing of the extensive game we use to model the economy. This
section serves mainly to formalize the sequencing that we have already sketched above.
Since bonds are resaleable but repos are not, we outline the timing for these two cases
separately. We describe ﬁrst what can happen when Bank A issues bonds at Date 0
and then what can happen when Bank A borrows via repos at Date 0. The repo case
is slightly more complicated because credit chains can emerge.
The ﬁrst move is Banks A’s choice of ﬁnancing instrument:
Date 0
0.0 Bank A chooses either bonds or repos
We write the subsequent moves separately for the cases in which Bank A chooses bonds
and in which Bank A chooses repos.
Several of the moves below involve one bank making a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to
another bank. Should the second bank reject the oﬀer, it forgoes the relationship. This
captures the idea that the credit market is competitive.
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Bank A Borrows via Bonds. If Bank A issues bonds, the game proceeds as
follows:
Date 0
0.1 Bank A oﬀers Bank B face value FA to borrow IA
• Bank B accepts or rejects
Date 1
1.1 Bank B is hit by a liquidity shock or not
1.2 If Bank B is hit by a liquidity shock
• Bank B oﬀers Bank C a resale price to sell its claim to FA from Bank A
– Bank C accepts or rejects
Date 2
2.1 The return R˜ on Bank A’s project realizes
2.2 Bank A either repays F to the bondholder or diverts and defaults
Recall from Subsection 2.2 that if the debtor defaults the bondholder’s payoﬀ is nor-
malized to zero to capture the costs of bankruptcy stays.
Bank A Borrows via Repos. If Bank A borrows via repos, the game proceeds
as follows:
Date 0
0.1 Bank A oﬀers Bank B face value FA to borrow IA
• Bank B accepts or rejects
Date 1
1.1 Bank B is hit by a liquidity shock or not
1.2 If Bank B is hit by a liquidity shock
• Bank B oﬀers Bank C FB to borrow IB from Bank C
– Bank C accepts or rejects
Date 2
2.1 The return R˜ on Bank A’s project realizes
2.2 Bank A either repays FA to Bank B or diverts and defaults
2.3 If Bank B has borrowed from Bank C
• Bank B either repays FB to Bank C or diverts and defaults
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2.5 Assumptions
In this section we make three restrictions on parameters. The ﬁrst assumption im-
plies that Bank A’s project is a good investment, even if all revenues are lost due to
bankruptcy costs when R˜ = RL. Thus there is no question as to whether the project
should go ahead.
Assumption 2.5.1.
1 < πRH .
The second assumption, in contrast, says that the returns on Bank A’s project are not
so high that it can lever up inﬁnitely. Speciﬁcally, it says that limits to enforcement
are severe enough (θ is low enough) that Bank A’s credit is rationed according to the
amount of its own capital it invests in its project.13
Assumption 2.5.2.
θR¯ < 1.
Finally, the third assumption says that the return RL that realizes in the event of
failure is relatively low. The assumption suﬃces to ensure that Bank A will default in
equilibrium whenever its project fails (R˜ = RL).







The equilibrium concept is subgame perfect equilibrium. We will solve the model by
backward induction.
3 Results
In this section we solve the model. We analyze ﬁrst the case when Bank A borrows via
bonds, then, separately, the case in which Bank A borrows via repos. We then compare
Bank A’s payoﬀs from borrowing via each instrument and solve for the equilibrium
borrowing instrument. Finally, we study the implications for systemic risk; here we
show our main result that increasing enforceability increases systemic risk.
13Note that the alternative assumption that Bank A’s project has decreasing-returns-to-scale would also
prevent its project from becoming inﬁnitely big; we choose the constant-returns-to-scale set-up because it is
a particularly tractable way to capture the economic mechanism we wish to study.
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3.1 Borrowing via Bonds
We now solve for the equilibrium of the subgame in which Bank A issues bonds. In
particular we wish to calculate its loan size IbA and its Date 0 PV Π
b
A, where the
superscript “b” indicates that the quantities correspond to the subgame in which Bank
A has borrowed via bonds.
In order to ﬁnd the amount IbA that Bank B is willing to lend to Bank A against a
promise to repay F bA, we solve the game backward. We begin with the case in which
Bank B is not hit by a liquidity shock. In this case, it recovers the expected value of
Bank A’s debt. If there is no default, then Bank B recovers F bA and, if there is default,
it recovers zero. Bank A defaults exactly when it prefers to repay rather than to divert
capital, or when θ(e + IbA)R < F
b
A for R ∈ {RL, RH}. It repays zero when it defaults
due to the stay in bankruptcy and it repays FA otherwise. This is summarized in the
expression below.
expected bond repayment =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
FA if θ(e+ IbA)RL ≥ F
b
A,
πFA if θ(e+ IbA)RL < F
b











Now turn to the case in which Bank B is hit by a liquidity shock. Now it sells Bank
A’s bonds to Bank C in a competitive market. Bank C demands its break-even value,
which is the expected value of Bank A’s debt. This coincides with the expression above
for Bank A’s expected repayment, i.e.
bond resale price = π1{θ(e+IbA)RH≥F bA}




Thus, when Bank A issues bonds, Bank B’s payoﬀ is independent of whether Bank
B itself is hit by a liquidity shock. Bank B’s condition for accepting Bank A’s bond
oﬀer, i.e. the contract (FA, IA), reduces to the participation constraint that Bank B
must make a positive NPV investment. This (ex ante) participation constraint takes
into account the (ex post) limits to enforcement captured by θ. Hence, we can rewrite
the ﬁrst round of the game in which Bank A determines how much to borrow and
invest as a constrained optimization program. Bank A maximizes its proﬁts subject to
its borrowing constraints. The next lemma states this problem.
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Lemma 3.1.1. F bA and I
b





(e+ I)R˜− F, (1− θ)(e+ I)R˜
}]
over F and I subject to
π1{θ(e+I)RH≥F} F + (1− π)1{θ(e+I)RL≥F} F ≥ I.
The program has a convex objective with a piecewise linear constraint, so it has
a corner solution. There are three possible solutions: (i) Bank A does not borrow at
all, (ii) Bank A borrows as much as it can while ensuring it will never default—i.e.
ensuring it can repay F even when R˜ = RL—or (iii) Bank A borrows as much as it can,
accepting that it will default when it fails but that it will still be able to repay when
it succeeds—i.e. ensuring it can repay F when R˜ = RH . The next lemma states that,
given the assumptions in Subsection 2.5, this third possibility obtains in equilibrium,
i.e. Bank A will always lever up so much that it will default when its project fails.
Lemma 3.1.2.





Proof. See Appendix A.1
Because competition is perfect in the Date 1 market, Bank B sells Bank A’s bonds
at fair value if it suﬀers a liquidity shock at Date 1. As a result, Bank B’s Date 1 payoﬀ









having taken into account that the recovery value for Bank B is zero due to the stay in





Before Bank B is hit by a liquidity shock, Bank B has Bank A’s debt on the assets
side of its balance sheet. In response to the liquidity shock, Bank B sells Bank A’s
bonds, replacing this asset with cash on its balance sheet. This is depicted in Figure 6.
Note that Bank B only ever has equity on the right-hand side of its balance sheet—when
Bank B funds Bank A via bonds, its balance sheet does not expand.
Now we can calculate Bank A’s expected equity value when it issues bonds. With




RH . With probability 1−π it fails
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Bank B’s Balance Sheet Composition when It Sells Bank A’s Bonds
Date 0
assets liabilities





Figure 6: When Bank B sells Bank A’s bonds to Bank C, it does not assume a new liability.
and diverts capital (1− θ)(e+ IbA). Thus,
ΠbA = π
(




























3.2 Borrowoing via Repos
We now solve for the equilibrium of the subgame in which Bank A issues repos. In
particular, we wish to calculate its loan size IrA and its Date 0 PV Π
r
A, where the
superscript “r” indicates that the quantities correspond to the subgame in which Bank
A has borrowed via repos.
Again we solve the game backward to determine the amount IrA that Bank B is
willing to lend to Bank A against the promise to repay F rA. We begin with the case
in which Bank B is not hit by a liquidity shock. In this case, it holds Bank A’s repos
to maturity and recovers the expected value of Bank A’s debt. If there is no default,
Bank B receives F rA and if there is default, it recovers θ(e+I
r
A)R for R ∈ {RL, RH}. As
before, Bank A defaults exactly when it prefers to repay than to divert capital, or when
θ(e + IrA)R < F
b
A. In contrast to the case of bonds, when Bank A defaults, its repo
creditors are not subject to the bankruptcy stay and, hence, they recover the fraction
17
of assets that Bank A does not divert. This is summarized in the expression below.










































Now turn to the case in which Bank B is hit by a liquidity shock. At Date 1, Bank
B now must ﬁnd liquidity in the interbank market. In contrast to the case of bond-
borrowing considered in Subsection 3.1, Bank A’s debt to Bank B is not resaleable.
Instead of liquidating Bank A’s bond in the interbank market as before, now Bank B
must borrow from Bank C to obtain liquidity. It does so by borrowing IB in exchange
for the promise to repay FB. But now Bank C must anticipate the enforcement frictions
it faces with Bank B: Bank B will divert if its promised repayments to Bank C are too
high. Speciﬁcally, Bank B diverts if it proﬁts more from diverting its repayment from
Bank A than it proﬁts from making its promised repayment FB to Bank C. This gives








If Bank B does divert and default on its debt to Bank C, then Bank C seizes Bank B’s
assets and recovers θmin{θ(e+ IrA)R˜, F
r
A}. Note, now, that since the interbank market
is competitive (Bank B makes Bank C a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer), Bank B will always
borrow an amount IB equal to its expected repayment (given the face value FB), so













Further, since Bank B has been hit by a liquidity shock, it values Date 1 consumption
inﬁnitely more than Date 2 consumption. Thus, it sets FB to maximize IB in the
equation above. Since the expectation is weakly increasing in FB, it is without loss of










Before Bank B is hit by a liquidity shock, it has Bank A’s debt on the assets side
18
Bank B’s Balance Sheet Expands when It Holds Bank A’s Repos
Date 0
assets liabilities




cash debt to C
debt from A equity
Figure 7: If Bank A borrows via repos and Bank B needs liquidity at the interim date, then
Bank B borrows from Bank C. Bank B’s balance sheet thus expands, as it holds debt on
both sides of its balance sheet.
of its balance sheet. In response to the liquidity shock, Bank B borrows from Bank C,
adding cash as an asset on its balance sheet. This is depicted in Figure 7. Note that, in
contrast with the bond case depicted in Figure 6, Bank B now has debt on both sides
of its balance sheet—it has debt from Bank A on the assets side and debt to Bank C
on the liabilities side. In other words, Bank B is a link in a credit chain. When Bank
B lends via repos, its balance sheet blows up when it needs liquidity.
We now calculate Bank B’s expected payoﬀ given it holds Bank A’s repo with face
value FA. To do so, we take the expectation of the value of the repo to Bank B across
the two cases above—the case in which it is not hit by a liquidity shock and holds Bank
A’s repo till maturity and the case in which it is hit by a liquidity shock and borrows
from Bank C,





























Bank A determines its repo contract (F rA, I
r
A) to maximize its PV Π
r
A. It does by
making Bank B a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer such that the value of the contract expressed
above just induces Bank B to accept the oﬀer. Thus, we can rewrite Bank A’s choice
of contract as a constrained maximization problem in which the objective is Bank A’s
PV and the constraint is that Bank B must (weakly) prefer the repo promise F rA to
its cash IrA. We can now rewrite Bank A’s choice of repo contract as an optimization
program. Lemma 3.2.1 summarizes.
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Lemma 3.2.1. F rA and I
r





(e+ I)R˜− F, (1− θ)(e+ I)R˜
}]











As in the program in Lemma 3.1.1 above for the bond borrowing case, there will
be a corner solution. Lemma 3.2.2 now states that in equilibrium Bank A either does
not borrow at all or it exhausts its debt capacity completely, promising the maximum
repayment.
Lemma 3.2.2. In equilibrium, Bank A either does not borrow, F rA = I
r
A = 0, or sets F
r
A
large enough to induce the maximum repayment,14





Proof. See Appendix A.2.
















The enforceability parameter θ appears in this equation twice, because enforceability
kicks in twice, once at each link in the credit chain—Bank B has to enforce its contract
with Bank A and Bank C has to enforce its contract with Bank B. We can solve this













which allows us to write down an expression for the PV of Bank A when it funds itself












RH , the repayment does not depend on F
r
A






















RH in the sense that
it induces the same transfers for each realization of R˜. If Ir
A










R˜ = RL, Bank A diverts a proportion 1− θ of its assets. Thus, if Bank A borrows,
ΠrA = π
(



































Recall that Bank A may prefer not to borrow and therefore prefer just to invest its
inside equity e into its project, in which case ΠrA = eR¯. Thus, the value of borrowing
via repos is the greater of the value of not borrowing and borrowing with face value
















3.3 The Equilibrium Borrowing Instrument
This section presents our main theoretical result that increasing enforceability θ leads
Bank A to favor repos and thereby leads to credit chains—Bank C lends to Bank B,
which lends to Bank A.
To determine when Bank A borrows via bonds and when it borrows via repos, we
compare its PV in each case by comparing the expression for ΠbA in equation (2) with
the expression for ΠrA in equation (3). This comparison is illustrated in Figure 8. Bank


















With the above equation, we have derived that increased enforceability leads Bank A
to prefer repos. We now state this as Proposition 3.3.1.
Proposition 3.3.1. Bank A borrows via bonds only if
θ ≤ θ∗ :=
πRH − μR¯
(1− μ)R¯
and borrows via repos otherwise.
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Figure 8: When enforceability is low (θ ≤ θ∗) Bank A’s PV is higher from issuing bonds; when
enforceability is high (θ > θ∗) Bank A’s PV is higher from issuing repos. The parameters
used to create the plot are e = 1, R¯ = 1.4, πRH = 1.2, and μ = 1/2.
This result is the key result behind our main ﬁnding that increasing enforceability
can increase systemic risk, since more enforceability leads banks to rely more on non-
resaleable instruments—on repos—and borrowing via non-resaleable instruments leads
to credit chains.
3.4 Implications for Systemic Risk
In this subsection we analyze the eﬀect of increasing enforceability on risk in the ﬁnan-
cial system as a whole. Here, we analyze when risk on the balance sheet of a single
institution can spread beyond that institution’s immediate creditors, in particular, when
one bank’s default causes the default of other banks. This is our notion of systemic
risk, which we call a default cascade and restate in the next deﬁnition.
Definition 3.4.1. A default cascade is an event in which a bank fails as a consequence
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of another bank’s failure. In the model, this occurs whenever Bank B fails (which occurs
only because its debtor, Bank A, has failed).
Bank B can fail only when it has debt to default on. Bank B has debt only when
it borrows from Bank C to satisfy its liquidity needs. This occurs only when Bank
A borrows via repos. In this case, since repos are not resaleable, Bank B cannot ﬁnd
liquidity by selling Bank A’s debt in the market; as a result, Bank B borrows from Bank
C creating a credit chain. Hence, Bank A’s default can lead to Bank B’s default—i.e.
default cascades can occur only when Bank A borrows via repos. The next result is that
default cascades only happen when enforceability is high. This follows as a corollary of
Proposition 3.3.1.






This result says that increasing enforceability increases systemic risk in the sense
that increasing enforceability can cause default cascades. Speciﬁcally, with repo bor-
rowing, a credit chain emerges in which Bank A borrows from Bank B and Bank B
borrows from Bank C. When Bank A’s project fails it defaults on its debt to Bank B.
This depletes the left-hand side of Bank B’s balance sheet, so Bank B cannot cover its
debt to Bank C and Bank B also defaults.
4 Generalizations and Robustness
In this section, we extend the analysis in three ways. First, we argue that our main
result that increasing enforceability increases systemic risk is broadly applicable, not
only in the interbank market. Second, we consider implications for social welfare,
not just systemic risk. Third, we discuss the role of additional collateral within the
application to the interbank market and we argue that including it would not overturn
our qualitative results.
4.1 More General Instruments
So far, we have focused on the trade-oﬀ between borrowing via bonds (commercial
paper) and repos in the interbank market. In this section, we argue that our main
result—that increasing enforceability leads to credit chains and, therefore, increases
systemic risk—generalizes to other markets. In fact, the basic mechanism may be at
work in nearly all debt markets, even absent the formal, legal diﬀerences in resaleability
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and bankruptcy seniority that exist between repos and bonds. The reason is as follows.
In addition to legal non-resaleabiity, fundamental economic frictions such as adverse
selection can inhibit the resaleability of debt.15 A debt issuer may mitigate these
frictions at a cost—for example by using securitization to combat the lemons problem—
and thereby make debt resaleable or “liquid” in secondary markets. When enforceability
increases, however, the relative beneﬁts of resaleability decrease and, as a result, issuers
are not willing to pay the cost to issue resaleable debt. Thus, for high enforceability,
creditors, unable to sell their assets, may enter into new debt contracts to meet liquidity
needs. This is the creation of a credit chain, which harbors systemic risk, just as in our
baseline analysis. We formalize this argument below.
Here we abstract from legal asymmetries. Rather, we follow Kiyotaki and Moore
(2005) and assume that adverse selection frictions inhibit the resale of debt in the
secondary market, but that an issuer can pay an upfront cost to mitigate these fric-
tions.16 Speciﬁcally, we modify the model above in the following way. When Bank A
borrows from Bank B, it can pay a proportional cost c to securitize its project. That
is, if Bank A securitizes its project, its returns are decreased by the proportion c to
(1 − c)R, R ∈ {RL, RH}. Securitization circumvents the adverse selection friction,
making Bank A’s debt resaleable. There are no bankruptcy costs. We now analyze
when Bank A will choose to securitize its project, forfeiting some returns but making
its debt liquid/resaleable.
Consider ﬁrst the case in which Bank A does not securitize its project. Here its PV
is simply the repo PV expression in equation (4):











Now turn to the case in which Bank A securitizes its project. Securitization lowers the
returns on its project, but eliminates the cost associated with the liquidity shock. This
observation allows us to write Bank A’s PV in this no-securitization case immediately.
We simply scale down the returns by a factor 1− c and replace the probability 1−μ of








15See Kiyotaki and Moore (2002) for a list of reasons that “between the date of issue and the date of
delivery, an initial creditor C may not be able to resell [the debtor] D’s paper on to a third party...insofar as
D gets locked in with C ex post.” (p. 62)
16See page 703 of Kiyotaki and Moore (2005) for a discussion of this adverse-selection-based microfoun-
dation. Kiyotaki and Moore (2000, 2001a, 2005, 2012) make similar assumptions.
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Now, Bank A securitizes only when Πsec.A ≥ Π
no sec.
A . This inequality leads to the
main result of this section, that Bank A securitizes only below a threshold level of
enforceability θ∗∗. Thus, credit chains emerge only for high levels of enforceability and,
therefore, increasing enforceability increases systemic risk as in Subsection 3.4 above.
We summarize this in Proposition 4.1.1 below.
Proposition 4.1.1. Bank A securitizes its debt only if enforceability θ is below a thresh-












Thus, credit chains emerge and default cascades can occur for only high levels of en-
forceability.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
This result demonstrates that our ﬁnding that increasing enforceability can increase
systemic risk is not speciﬁc to the interbank market. Rather, the interbank market
is just an environment in which systemic risk arising from credit chains is especially
important and in which formal legal asymmetries make the trade-oﬀs between resaleable
debt like commercial paper and non-resaleable debt like repos especially stark.
4.2 Welfare Consequences of Systemic Risk
Our analysis has focused on systemic risk and how to mitigate it. Whereas many
regulations aim expressly to decrease systemic risk, we believe that it is important
to acknowledge that decreasing systemic risk is just one component of a regulator’s
objective function, and some policies that reduce systemic risk may have other costs.
In this section, we argue that, in our model, decreasing systemic risk increases social
welfare under reasonable assumptions.
We assume that there is a ﬁxed social cost of each bank’s default.
Assumption 4.2.1. Each bank’s default has social cost D.
This assumption leads immediately to the result that the social costs of bank default
are higher when Bank A borrows via repos than when Bank A borrows via bonds.
Lemma 4.2.1. The social costs of default are higher when Bank A has borrowed via
repos than when Bank A has borrowed via bonds, i.e.
(1− π)(2− μ)D > (1− π)D, (5)
25
where (1−π)D is the expected social cost of bank default when Bank A borrows via bonds
and (1 − π)(2 − μ)D is the expected social cost of bank default when Bank A borrows
via repos.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Viewed in conjunction with Proposition 3.3.1, this proposition implies that decreasing
credit market frictions can decrease welfare,17 as we state formally in the next corollary.
Figure 9 depicts the social costs of default as a function of enforceability θ.
Corollary 4.2.1. Increasing credit frictions can decrease welfare. Speciﬁcally, in-
creasing enforceability from below θ∗ to above θ∗ leads to an increase in the social costs
of default from (1− π)D to (1− π)(2− μ)D.












Figure 9: When enforceability is low, Bank A funds itself via bonds and the social costs
of default are low; when enforceability is high, Bank A funds itself via repos and the social
costs of default are high. The parameters used to create the plot are (1 − π)D = 100, and
μ = 1/2.
17Note that decreasing credit frictions also has a positive eﬀect on welfare. It allows Bank A to scale up
its project further. Thus, away from the cutoﬀ θ∗ increasing enforceability has the standard positive eﬀect.
However, we emphasize here the negative eﬀect of increasing enforceability around θ∗.
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4.3 The Role of Collateral
Repos and asset-backed commercial paper are collateralized by ﬁnancial securities. In
our model, we have assumed that Bank A’s project collateralizes its debt contracts. In
this section, we brieﬂy discuss the consequences of using other securities as collateral
and argue that our main results are robust. Our result that credit chains emerge only
when Bank A borrows via repos is a direct result of repos’ non-resaleability, so the
inclusion of further collateral would not aﬀect that result. What we need to argue is
that increasing enforceability increases the value of repos relatively more than the value
of bonds.
Suppose that Bank A borrowed from Bank B via a repo collateralized by securities.
Denote the value of these securities at maturity by the random variable s˜. When Bank
B is hit by a liquidity shock, it rehypothecates the securities to borrow from Bank C,
creating a credit chain. Note that Bank C holds the securities.
Now we argue that as long as there is some risk that the securities will not cover
all debts, the credit chain leads (with some probability) to two contracts having to be
enforced. Thus, the limited enforcement frictions kick in twice with repos, giving our
result that the value of repos is more sensitive than the value of bonds to increases in
enforceability.
Suppose that s˜ < FB. In this case, even after Bank C has liquidated its collateral s˜,
it must claim on Bank B for the remainder of its debt. This claim is subject to limited
enforceability. Further, Bank B is now without collateral because it was liquidated by
Bank C. Bank B now has to claim on Bank A for its repayment. This claim is subject
to limited enforceability. In summary, when s˜ < FB, limited enforcement frictions kick
in at each link in the credit chain.
Thus, our mechanism is robust to the inclusion of ﬁnancial securities as collateral
as long as their value s˜ is not perfectly riskless, as no asset value is.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have developed a model to analyze the connection between credit
market frictions and systemic risk. We argued that a decrease in credit market frictions
can lead to an increase in systemic risk and a decrease in welfare—even though a
decrease in credit market frictions makes each market function better in isolation, it
can harm the ﬁnancial system as a whole. The reason is that in markets with low credit
market frictions, ﬁnancial institutions are likely to borrow via non-resaleable debt (e.g.
repos) rather than resaleable debt (e.g. bonds) and borrowing via non-resaleable debt
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leads to credit chains, which harbor systemic risk.
Our model is stylized, but we hope that it draws attention to some features of debt
claims and ﬁnancial markets that may deserve more attention in the policy debate.
Most notably, borrowing via resalable instruments mitigates systemic risk. Therefore,
a regulator aiming to combat systemic risk should encourage ﬁnancial institutions to
use resaleable debt to fund themselves. However, improvements in ﬁnancial markets
that mitigate credit frictions (e.g., improving creditor rights) may have unintended
consequences. Speciﬁcally, lowering credit frictions may induce ﬁnancial institutions to
borrow via non-resaleable debt, increasing systemic risk. In particular, the exemption to
the automatic stay for repos appears to have had unintended consequences, increasing
repo borrowing, which lead to credit chains, consistent with the predictions of the
model.
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A Omitted Derivations and Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3.1.2
Since the program in Lemma 3.1.1 is linear, it must have a corner solution. Thus, there
are three possible solutions: the Bank A either borrows nothing, borrows the maximum
so that it never defaults, or borrows the maximum so that it defaults only when it fails.
The case in which it borrows the maximum so that it defaults only when it fails is
analyzed in the main text and yields expected equity value given in equation (2),
ΠbA
∣∣∣
















if and only if πRH > 1, which is guaranteed
by Assumption 2.5.1. Thus, it remains only to compare the case in which Bank A
defaults only when it fails with the case in which Bank A never defaults.
If Bank A never defaults, it borrows as much as it can given that it does not default
in the event that R˜ = RL. Thus, it borrows
IA = FA = θ(e+ IA)RL
and its expected equity value is
ΠA|never default = π
(
(e+ IA)RH − FA
)
+ (1− π)(1− θ)(e+ IA)RL
=
(







(1 − θ)RH − (1− θ)RH +RH − θRL)
)















Assumption 2.5.3 ensures that this expression is always smaller than ΠbA
∣∣
repay if R˜ = RH
from equation (2). Therefore, Bank A always sets FA = πθ(e+ IA)RH , as in the case
analyzed in the main text.
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 3.2.2
Since there are no ineﬃciencies from default in the repo case, if Bank A borrows it
is without loss of generality to assume that Bank A defaults whenever it borrows, i.e.
that F = ∞ if I > 0 or, alternatively, since R ≤ RH , that F = θ(e + I)RH whenever
I > 0. Thus it suﬃces to consider F = θ(e+ I)RH and F = 0, as stated in the lemma.
Note that a more explicit computational proof could also be done in exact analogy
with Lemma 3.1.2, but we omit it here.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 4.1.1
Recall that Bank A borrows via non-securitized debt if and only if Πno sec.A ≥ Π
sec.
A .
Recalling the expressions for Πno sec.A and Π
sec.
A in Subsection 4.1 from Subsection 4.1,




































Since the lower root is negative whenever it exists and θ ∈ (0, 1), this is equivalent to
saying that Bank A securitizes only if












A.4 Proof of Lemma 4.2.1
Bank A defaults with probability 1 − π. Since no other bank ever defaults if Bank A
has borrowed via bonds, the expected social costs of default are simply (1 − π)D if
Bank A has borrowed via bonds.
If Bank A has borrowed via repos, and only if Bank A has borrowed via repos,
Bank B defaults if and only if Bank A defaults and Bank B itself has been hit by a
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liquidity shock. This liquidity shock occurs with independent probability 1− μ. Thus,
the expected social costs of default are
(1− π)D + (1− π)(1 − μ)D = (1− π)(2− μ)D.
Since μ < 1, the social costs are greater when Bank A has borrowed via repos.
31
References
Acemoglu, D., A. Ozdaglar, and A. Tahbaz-Salehi (2013, January). Systemic Risk and
Stability in Financial Networks. NBER Working Papers 18727, National Bureau of
Economic Research, Inc.
Allen, F., A. Babus, and E. Carletti (2012). Asset commonality, debt maturity and
systemic risk. Journal of Financial Economics 104 (3), 519–534.
Allen, F. and D. Gale (2000, February). Financial Contagion. Journal of Political
Economy, University of Chicago Press 108 (1), 1–33.
Antinolﬁ, G., F. Carapella, C. Kahn, A. Martin, D. Mills, and E. Nosal (2014). Repos,
Fire Sales, and Bankruptcy Policy. Review of Economic Dynamics, (forthcoming).
Bai, J., T. Philippon, and A. Savov (2012). Have ﬁnancial markets become more
informative? Technical report.
Bank for International Settlements (2013). Technical report, CGFS Publications No
49.
Bliss, R. R. and G. G. Kaufman (2006, April). Derivatives and systemic risk: Netting,
collateral, and closeout. Journal of Financial Stability 2 (1), 55–70.
Bluhm, M., E. Faia, and J. Krahnen (2013). Endogenous banks’ network, cascades and
systemic risk. Technical report.
Bolton, P. and M. Oehmke (2014). Should derivatives be privileged in bankruptcy?
Journal of Finance (forthcoming).
Bolton, P. and D. S. Scharfstein (1990, March). A theory of predation based on agency
problems in ﬁnancial contracting. American Economic Review 80 (1), 93–106.
Cabrales, A., P. Gottardi, and F. Vega-Redondo (2013, January). Risk-sharing and
contagion in networks. Economics Working Papers we1301, Universidad Carlos III,
Departamento de EconomÌ?a.
Comotto, R. (2014). ICMA Eutopian repo council: a guild to best practice in the
European repo market. Technical report.
Comotto, R. (2015). European repo market survey. Technical report, International
Capital Market Association.
32
Copeland, A., A. Martin, and M. Walker (2014). Repo runs: Evidence from the tri-
party repo market. The Journal of Finance 69 (6), 2343–2380.
Domowitz, I., J. Glen, and A. Madhavan (2001). Liquidity, volatility and equity trading
costs across countries and over time. International Finanace 4 (2).
Duﬃe, D. and D. Skeel (2006). A dialogue on the costs and beneﬁts of the automatic
stays for derivatives and repurchase agreements. Technical report, Faculty Scholar-
ship, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
Edwards, F. R. and E. R. Morrison (2005). Derivatives and the bankruptcy code: Why
the special treatment? Yale Journal on Regulation 22, 91–122.
Elliott, M., B. Golub, and M. Jackson (2014). Financial networks and contagion.
American Economic Review (forthcoming).
Gale, D. and S. Kariv (2007). Financial networks. The American Economic Re-
view 97 (2), 99–103.
Garbade, K. (2006, May). The evolution of repo contracting conventions in the 1980s.
Glode, V. and C. Opp (2013). Intermediating Adverse Selection. Technical report.
Gorton, G. and A. Metrick (2010). Haircuts. Review (Nov), 507–520.
Gorton, G. and A. Metrick (2012). Securitized banking and the run on repo. Journal
of Financial Economics 104 (3), 425–451.
Gorton, G. and G. Pennacchi (1990, March). Financial Intermediaries and Liquidity
Creation. Journal of Finance 45 (1), 49–71.
Greenwood, J., J. M. Sanchez, and C. Wang (2013). Quantifying the impact of ﬁnancial
development on economic development. Review of Economic Dynamics 16 (1), 194 –
215. Special issue: Misallocation and Productivity.
Grossman, S. J. and O. D. Hart (1986, August). The costs and beneﬁts of ownership:
A theory of vertical and lateral integration. Journal of Political Economy 94 (4),
691–719.
Gu, C., F. Mattesini, C. Monnet, and R. Wright (2013). Banking: A New Monetarist
Approach. Review of Economic Studies 80 (2), 636–662.
33
Hart, O. and J. Moore (1989, May). Default and renegotiation: A dynamics model of
debt. Working Paper 520, MIT.
Hart, O. and J. Moore (1990, December). Property rights and the nature of the ﬁrm.
Journal of Political Economy 98 (6), 1119–58.
Hart, O. and J. Moore (1994, November). A theory of debt based on the inalienability
of human capital. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (4), 841–79.
Hart, O. and J. Moore (1998, February). Default and renegotiation: A dynamic model
of debt. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 113 (1), 1–41.
Homquist, E. and J. Gallin (2014). Repurchase agreements in the ﬁnancial accounts
of the United States. http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/notes/feds-
notes/2014/ repurchase-agreements-in-the-ﬁnancial-accounts-of-the-united-states-
20140630.html.
Homstrom, B. and J. Tirole (2011). Inside and Outside Liquidity. The MIT Press.
Infante, S. (2015). Liquidity windfalls: The consequences of repo rehypothecation.
Technical report, Federal Reserve Board of Governors Finance and Economics Dis-
cussion Series 2015-22.
Jones, C. (2002). A century of stock returns and trading costs. Columbia University
working paper.
Kahn, C. M. and H. J. Park (2015). Collateral, rehypothecation, and eﬃciency. UIUC
Working paper.
Kahn, C. M. and W. Roberts (2007). Transferability, ﬁnality, and debt settlement.
Journal of Monetary Economics 54 (4), 955 – 978.
Kiyotaki, N. and J. Moore (2000). Inside money and liquidity. working paper.
Kiyotaki, N. and J. Moore (2001a). Evil is the root of all money. Clarendon Lectures,
Oxford.
Kiyotaki, N. and J. Moore (2001b). Liquidity, business cycles, and monetary policy.
Clarendon Lectures, Oxford.
Kiyotaki, N. and J. Moore (2002). Evil is the root of all money. American Economic
Review, Papers and Proceedings 92 (2), 62–66.
34
Kiyotaki, N. and J. Moore (2005, 04/05). Financial Deepening. Journal of the European
Economic Association 3 (2-3), 701–713.
Kiyotaki, N. and J. Moore (2012, March). Liquidity, Business Cycles, and Monetary
Policy. NBER working papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Krishnamurthy, A., S. Nagel, and D. Orlov (2014). Sizing up repo. The Journal of
Finance 69 (6), 2381–2417.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-De-Silanes, and A. Shleifer (2006, 02). What Works in Securities
Laws? Journal of Finance 61 (1), 1–32.
Lee, J. (2015). Collateral circulation and repo spreads. Technical report.
Lubben, S. J. (2009). Derivatives and bankruptcy: The ﬂawed case for special treat-
ment. University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 12 (1), 61–78.
Morrison, E., M. Roe, and C. Sontchi (2014, August). Rolling back the repo safe
harbors. Business Lawyer 69 (4).
Rahi, R. and J.-P. Zigrand (2013). Market quality and contagion in fragmented markets.
Technical report.
Roe, M. J. (2011). The derivatives players’ payment priorities as ﬁnancial crisis accel-
erator. Stanford Law Review 63, 539–590.
Singh, M. (2010). The velocity of pledged collateral. Technical report, IMF.
Singh, M. and J. Aitken (2010). The (sizable) role of rehypothecation in the shadow
banking system. Technical report, IMF.
Skeel, D. and T. Jackson (2012). Transaction consistency and the new ﬁnance in
bankruptcy. Columbia Law Review 112, 152–202.
Stulz, R. M. (2009). Financial derivatives: Lessons from the subprime crisis. The
Milken Institute Review .
Townsend, R. and N. Wallace (1987). Circulating private debt: An example with a
coordination problem. In E. C. Prescott and N. Wallace (Eds.), Contractual Ar-
rangements for Intertemporal Trade. University of Minnesota Press.
Zawadowski, A. (2013). Entangled ﬁnancial systems. Review of Financial Studies 26 (5),
1291–1323.
35
		
